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 Anticipating regional integration
in Africa
Regional integration – ceding some national interests in trade
policy for the long term purpose of higher growth and
improved livelihoods for citizens – is being embraced by
countries around the world. As part of this movement,
Ministers from 26 African countries and three Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) have been discussing the
formation of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), with an
action plan released by the African Union calling for a
continental customs union to be formed in 2019. However, in
the tradition of many similar integration efforts, the expected
December TFTA launch has now been postponed until
February 2015.
Establishing ‘deep integration’
Establishing the ‘deep integration’ necessary to the customs
union’s success first requires basic trade liberalisation, followed
by what Melo and Tsikata call ‘trade facilitation’, facilitated by
regionally shared infrastructure as well as common institutions
of business practices and standards. The experience of the East
African Community (EAC), a customs union with only five
members, brings to light some of the details of reform that, if
left unaddressed, can greatly delay deeper integration.
The most recent EAC integration efforts began over a decade
ago. The EAC Customs Union launched in 2005 with the ‘Big
3’, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, and later expanded, adding
Rwanda and Burundi in 2009. Officially, internal tariffs were
removed, and a 3 band (0%, 10%, and 25%) common external
tariff was applied starting 2010.
Compromise has been challenging, and the EAC has already
experienced a close call. At the end of September 2014, the
EAC failed to ratify its pending Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) with the EU. Thus Kenya temporarily lost its
duty-free-quota-free (DFQF) access. The least developed
country status of the remaining four EAC members – Uganda,
Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi – guaranteed them DFQF
status under the EU’s Everything but Arms regime.
Fortunately for Kenya, the venture came through on the 16  of
October, when the EAC and EU initialled a region-to-region
agreement. Kenya regained DFDQ access, while its EAC
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partners effectively gained nothing except the obligation to
eventually liberalize rates on 80% of EU imports. Melo and
Regolo attribute this compromise to a high prioritisation of
REC integration. Meanwhile, lingering trade frictions in the
EAC indicate the influence of a strong Kenyan negotiating team
in the EPA process, and that, rather than universally prioritising
integration, members continue to pursue individual interests.
Figure 1: Intra-regional imports have increased but lag behind
total imports
While intra-regional imports have increased, as seen in Figure 1,
they lag behind total imports. Specifically, regional import
volumes have declined from 8% of the region’s total imports in
2005 to under 6% in 2013. To add perspective, intra-regional
trade volumes for EU and NAFTA were around 65% and 45%,
respectively, of those regions’ total trade in 2011.
Deep integration is hindered by a range of factors that include:
rules of origin; non-tariff barriers such as roadblocks and
complex licensing regimes; and deficient transportation
infrastructure. Additionally, EAC regulations have potential
loopholes and discretionary options to help mitigate perceived
adverse effects on local economies.
As TFTA activities progress, the EAC has a limited window of
time to determine the standards to promote within the larger
26-member group. EAC reform leaders should push for
improved enforcement and accelerated reforms across the EAC
in order to present a credible platform. They should leverage
moments like the EPA negotiations to advance their position.
Rules of origin and certificates of origin
Any final goods produced within the EAC face limits on
imported inputs and must meet a minimum value-added
criterion. Specifically, for goods not entirely originating in EAC
states, EAC rules of origin require that:
 
1. Such goods have a cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) value
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1. Such goods have a cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) value
comprised of no more than 60% of imported materials
2. The value added is at minimum 35% of ex-factory costs
3. Final goods are transformed enough to list under a separate
tariff from any imported inputs
 
Although the rules of origin seem simple, enforcing them has
been hampered by coordination problems at the borders, where
certificates of origin have not been sufficiently harmonised and
account for an estimated one fourth of the EAC’s non-tariff
barriers complaints. 
, compiled by the World Bank and the EAC
Secretariat shows that Tanzania had the highest share of
reported problems related to certificates (50%), followed by
Uganda (30%), and Kenya and Rwanda (10% each).
Simplifying rules of origin should be aggressively pursued
before fully joining the TFTA — which will require additional
harmonisation across the now 26 states — so that the EAC has
a more cohesive negotiating position. The EAC could
potentially coordinate with the Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA), as the two rules of origin
regimes are currently similar. The larger bloc could then exert
pressure against the stricter regime in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC).
Figure 2: EAC partner states’ membership in free trade areas
Non-tariff barriers
Several administrative and legal requirements likewise increase
time and trade costs. According to the Scorecard, Tanzania has
the most non-tariff barriers (18), followed by Kenya (16),
Uganda (9), Rwanda (5), and then Burundi (3). Before arriving
at EAC borders, traders must navigate a series of agencies and
obtain the necessary transport permits, an inconvenience
exacerbated when agencies are not located near customs posts.
Furthermore, the EAC currently lacks harmonised certification
procedures, license systems, and any preferential treatment of
EAC-based traders.
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Despite the 2011 launch of a time-bound programme to
eliminate internal non-tariff barriers, their persistence, and the
emergence of new non-tariff barriers demonstrate the challenge
of their removal. The Scorecard’s analysis found sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) measures to be the most enduring,
comprising about 30% of reported non-tariff barriers, while
extra taxes and fees account for almost 20% of reported non-
tariff barriers. Promoting the benefits of TFTA membership at
home will be easier if EAC traders can expect limited non-tariff
barriers in the TFTA. Advocating such an environment will be
easier if the EAC can show that its members impose limited or
zero non-tariff barriers.
Provisions for exceptions
The EAC CU Protocol includes two mechanisms to grant
members flexibility in the face of negative impacts of the CET.
A “stay of application scheme” allows Members to effectively
suspend the common external tariff temporarily, while a “duty
remission scheme” awards exemptions to applicant firms on an
individual basis.
The World Bank/EAC Scorecard analysis reported that stay of
applications have not affected trade significantly. However, as
duty remission is currently awarded to firms on a case by case
basis, this provision creates opportunities for corruption and
favouritism. Secondly, duty remissions have been applied in
ways that depart from the underlying principles of regional
integration. For example, the FAO has cited how Kenya has
used this provision to open its rice market to Pakistan, in
exchange for market access for Kenyan tea exports in Pakistan.
Again, these potential loopholes can be exponentially more
complex across 26 states if the EAC sends a signal that such
behaviour is permissible.
Opportunity for leadership
The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) offers enormous market
potential for East African Community (EAC) states as well as a
staggering organisational challenge. The EAC’s strongest
position in TFTA will be as a group and should be used to
argue for reforms and market practices that best reflect and
complement the EAC’s current policy trajectory. The credible
force of these arguments can only be strengthened by greater
practical enforcement of the overarching EAC trade legislation.
 
